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ABSTRACT 
There is a well-established literature examining the relationships 
between epistemology (the nature of knowledge), pedagogy (the 
nature of learning and teaching), and assessment. Learning 
Analytics (LA) is a new assessment technology and should 
engage with this literature since it has implications for when and 
why different LA tools might be deployed. This paper discusses 
these issues, relating them to an example construct, epistemic 
beliefs – beliefs about the nature of knowledge – for which 
analytics grounded in pragmatic, sociocultural theory might be 
well placed to explore. This example is particularly interesting 
given the role of epistemic beliefs in the everyday knowledge 
judgements students make in their information processing. 
Traditional psychological approaches to measuring epistemic 
beliefs have parallels with high stakes testing regimes; this paper 
outlines an alternative LA for epistemic beliefs which might be 
readily applied to other areas of interest. Such sociocultural 
approaches afford opportunity for engaging LA directly in high 
quality pedagogy. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
K.3.1 [Computers and Education]: Computer Uses in Education 
– collaborative learning. 
General Terms 
Measurement, Documentation, Design, Human Factors, Theory,  
Keywords 
Learning analytics; epistemology; pedagogy; educational 
assessment; discourse analytics; social learning analytics 
1. INTRODUCTION 
“Assessment is one area where notions of truth, accuracy and 
fairness have a very practical purchase in everyday life” [62]. It 
sits at the heart of learning, but is hugely controversial. This is 
directly relevant to Learning Analytics (LA), because – we argue 
– LA implicitly or explicitly promote particular assessment 
regimes.  
Presently, many education systems are predicated on assessment 
regimes seeking to accredit knowledge and skills gained by 
students through formal assessments – often exam- based. 
Proponents of such exams suggest they are the fairest way to 
assess competence and learning under controlled, reliable, 
conditions. Assessment, pedagogy and curriculum are 
fundamentally related [26], but many regimes of what has come to 
be termed ‘high stakes’ testing are criticised. For example, 
standardised assessments, including the Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA), American Standardised 
Assessment Tests (SATs) and English National Curriculum 
assessments (Sats), face myriad problems. Not least among these 
is that the exams are criticised comprehensively (e.g. [12, 23, 29]) 
for failing to represent adequately the types of problem people are 
likely to face in their everyday lives (external validity), and that 
they fail to represent an adequate conceptualisation of what it 
means to know – of what knowledge is (internal validity). The 
latter claim is that, while assessments clearly measure something, 
a good grade does not necessarily reflect mastery [12]. These 
fundamental issues are highlighted in a significant body of 
research (e.g. [12, 23, 29]), and one of the objectives in writing 
this paper is to clarify the implications of these issues for the 
Learning Analytics community.  
In this paper, Section 2 considers the relationship between 
assessment systems and the sorts of epistemic challenges students 
might encounter. Section 3 introduces the concept of epistemic 
beliefs, and Section 4 goes on to discuss the relationships between 
LA, epistemology, pedagogy and assessment. Section 4.2.1 then 
introduces pragmatic, sociocultural approaches to LA, which we 
suggest are well placed to probe or assess facets of learning which 
other LA may not adequately address. To exemplify this 
argument, we draw a parallel between the psychometric 
measurement of epistemic beliefs and high stakes testing regimes 
(Section 5). Our suggestion is that pragmatic, sociocultural 
approaches offer alternative LA which are well placed for 
exploring these areas of learning (Section 6). The final section 
discusses the role for established LA in this pragmatic, 
sociocultural LA. Throughout the paper, we particularly associate 
our approach to LA with that of Assessment for Learning (AfL) 
which uses continuous assessment with formative feedback to 
facilitate learning, in contrast to a focus on summative 
assessment, often through examinations. 
2. WHY WORRY ABOUT 
EPISTEMOLOGY? 
A primary concern of this paper is the relationship between 
epistemology, pedagogy and assessment. Epistemology is the 
philosophical study of what knowledge is, and what it means for 
someone to ‘know’ something. Central to the field of 
epistemology are questions regarding the nature of truth, the 
nature of justification, and types of knowledge, e.g. knowing how 
(skills), or knowing that (facts). Whatever ‘knowledge’ is, “it is 
uncontroversial, pre-philosophically, that education aims at the 
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imparting of knowledge: students are educated in part so that they 
may come to know things.” [54]. Thus, pedagogy may be seen in 
part to be the study of how to impart this knowledge to students – 
the science and development of approaches to teaching and 
learning for knowledge. However, epistemology’s relationship to 
the more familiar concepts of pedagogy and assessment is a topic 
of educational debate [12, 15, 32, 62], and we will consider this in 
relation to LA throughout this paper.  
Harlen [26] depicted a triadic relationship between pedagogy, 
assessment, and practice. Influenced by this, and Katz’s [31] 
description of “competency, epistemology and pedagogy: 
curriculum’s holy trinity” we depict the triad as in Figure 11.  
 
 
Figure 1: The Epistemology–Assessment–Pedagogy triad 
In this picture, epistemology could be seen as driving assessments 
that are aimed at uncovering student knowledge, and driving 
pedagogy to build high quality knowledge to that end. In this 
view, assessment is targetted at the learning of high level 
knowledge – it is assessment for learning. However, these 
relationships are not fixed; neither pedagogies nor epistemologies 
necessarily entail the other [13] (although they may implicate). 
Furthermore, as we will explore in this paper, assessment is 
always concerned with devising proxies for “knowledge”, around 
which there are philosophical (epistemological) and 
methodological issues. Some epistemological stances hold that it 
is not possible to ‘map’ the knowledge that students hold onto 
their responses in assessments in reliable and valid ways. This 
issue is further confounded by the methodological limitations of 
all assessment methods, and by extension LA. The situation is, 
therefore, a complex one – which facet of the triad has primacy 
over the others is not clear in either theory or practice, and may be 
dynamic according to need and circumstance. However, 
relationships between the three can certainly be identified, and 
throughout this paper we draw out some of these with respect to 
LA – which may be conceptualised as a component of assessment. 
Furthermore, we suggest that, although the relationship may not 
be a necessary one, assessment regimes do implicate particular 
epistemological stances. 
Consider the following example from Denmark to illustrate the 
argument that implicitly or explicitly, epistemological 
assumptions fundamentally shape pedagogy and assessment, and 
hence, the kinds of LA that one deploys to achieve those ends. In 
Denmark, a pilot project was conducted permitting the use of the 
internet (but not communication sites) to support students in five 
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  We could also introduce the notion of ‘folk psychology’ as a mediating 
factor between teacher’s views on knowledge, and pedagogy – for 
example, if we hold that some (particular) children will never learn x, 
we are unlikely to attempt to teach it (a pedagogical ‘move’) regardless 
of our epistemological stance regarding the nature of ‘x’ [41]. Although, 
in that paper [41] Olson and Bruner implicate epistemology in a number 
of their points regarding ‘folk pedagogy’. 
of the school leaver subject exams2. This made it possible to set 
questions requiring the use of multimedia and individual internet 
search. For example, a student might be asked to write about a 
poet whom they have not studied (and rote learned about), based 
on a poem by them and that of a contemporary, a short biography 
and perhaps an image from the time. They may be given 
unfamiliar resources, and permitted to source information for 
themselves from the internet. Thus, while Danish students are 
expected to evidence ‘knowledge-that’ – knowledge of facts – 
they must also exhibit a higher level of ‘knowing-how’, for 
example around information processing, synthesis, and 
metacognitive abilities – which remain unassessed in countries 
restricting access to external resources which might enhance the 
student’s capability. While this is of course simply one other 
(controlled) context, the example illustrates how even within a 
system reliant on exams, those exams might be conducted on a 
rather different epistemological grounding. Assessment regimes 
such as the Danish example may be taken to reflect a holistic 
epistemology in which how one comes to know is as important as 
what one comes to know, and in which it makes little sense to 
pick out individual tokens of knowledge in decontextualized ways 
[9, 11, 13, 31]. 
We can contrast such assessments with high stakes testing 
regimes whose construct validity and external validity have been 
questioned. For instance, Davis [10][12] argues that such 
instruments neither assess those facets of learning they set out to 
test, nor those facets of learning which would likely be utilized in 
the everyday deployment of knowledge in any particular domain. 
Davis has argued that high stakes testing is inadequate for 
understanding learning, in so far as its construal of that learning is 
necessarily restricted by a desire for highly reliable metrics of 
success. As such, it must exclude the nuanced understanding of 
student meaning-making, and the social context in which learning 
occurs, and how knowledge is constituted and enacted. He argues 
that this, as opposed to acquisition, is the appropriate way to talk 
about knowledge. Davis draws on notions of situated cognition 
[48] and sociocultural approaches [46] – particularly Säljö’s 
“Literacy, Digital Literacy and Epistemic Practices: The Co-
Evolution of Hybrid Minds and External Memory Systems” [47]. 
Säljö highlights that:  
From the learning and literacy points of view, such tools [memory 
aides and knowledge management systems of various sorts] imply 
that users’ knowledge and skills, as it were, are parasitic on the 
collective insights that have emerged over a long time and which 
have been entered into the instrument in a crystallized form: 
algorithms, grammatical rules and concepts, etc. The user will 
manipulate the artificial memory system in a number of ways in 
order to see what comes out of the processing that goes on in the 
machine [47] 
However,  
Engaging with external memory systems thus requires familiarity 
with a varied set of epistemic practices that range from 
deciphering letters on a page through familiarity with meaning-
making in relation to discourses and genres of texts and other 
media, to meta-knowledge about how such resources may be used. 
[47].  
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  Steen Lassen (a Danish Education Minister) on the piloting of internet 
access in exams: http://vimeo.com/8889340 subsequently adopted by 
some Danish universities [8]. 
Säljö is making an epistemological claim, specifically, a 
sociocultural, pragmatist claim: that there are important literacies 
and practices to be mastered in learning; that those should 
themselves be objects of assessment; and language and discourse 
are critical filters on our grasp of the world. Such an epistemology 
has implications for how we teach, what we assess, and which 
analytics techniques might be deployed. ‘Success’ can no longer 
be defined as a matter of regurgitating, unaided, the correct 
information in a two hour exam. Such an epistemology also – we 
argue – offers a perspective on why it is that, even in those 
technologically advanced societies which assess knowledge in 
less abstracted, socially embedded ways – such as Denmark – 
information retrieval (IR) and processing via the internet and 
search engines is a significant area of difficulty for students [59]; 
namely, that although this provides some wider access to 
information, this does not equate to knowledge. Student 
engagement with information should consider both the kinds of 
knowledge which we might call transferable competencies or 
skills – including those higher order skills often known as 
metacognitive abilities – and more propositional or fact based 
knowledge. In this context, we might consider information 
management, and IR not only as a means to an ends, but as a way 
to encourage interaction with a complex network of information. 
As argued by Tsai, as not only: 
…a cognitive tool or a metacognitive tool; rather, it can be 
perceived and used as an epistemological tool. When the Internet 
is used as an epistemological tool for instruction, learners are 
encouraged to evaluate the merits of information and knowledge 
acquired from Internet-based environments, and to explore the 
nature of learning and knowledge construction. [57]  
In this conception, learners are encouraged to think about the 
context, reliability, validity, certainty, and connectedness of 
knowledge.  
To summarise, this section has argued that a consideration of 
epistemology is important to LA in two related senses: 
 The ways that we assess, the sorts of tasks we set and the 
kinds of learning we believe to take place (and aim for) are 
bound up in our notions of epistemology. LA are not 
objective or neutral: data does not “speak for itself” but has 
been designed by a team who, implicitly or explicitly, 
perpetuate the pedagogical and epistemological assumptions 
that come with any assessment instrument.  
 The Danish example shows concretely how epistemology 
relates to assessment regimes. When knowledge is seen as 
something that can only be evidenced in contextualised 
activity, and when it is embedded in one’s physical and 
digital environment, the role of the internet is redefined as a 
metacognitive tool which cannot be excluded in assessment.  
These epistemological considerations foreground the quality of a 
student’s enquiry processes as important, not just whether they get 
the right answer. Analytics that provide process traces become 
particularly important, as we shall discuss in Section 6. 
3. EPISTEMIC BELIEFS 
One facet of students’ dynamic interaction with the world of 
information relates to how they conceptualise the information they 
require to answer any particular question – their epistemic beliefs 
regarding the nature of the question, and how it may be answered. 
The sorts of assessment, and pedagogy, which students are 
exposed to will relate to the types of epistemic challenge they 
encounter in their education – systems with a focus on ‘right 
answerism’ and limited access to external epistemic resources 
offer fewer opportunities for challenging knowledge claims [12, 
31]. This paper thus talks about two related concepts: 
1. Epistemology: Which we introduce above, and is related to 
the philosophical analysis and conceptualisation of 
curriculum content and assessment for knowledge 
2. Epistemic Beliefs: Which we now introduce, and relates to 
the intrapersonal, psychological conceptualisations that 
individuals hold regarding knowledge  
Indeed, a key component of AfL may be the disambiguation of the 
epistemic requirements of questions – in terms of understanding 
the question, its context, and the knowledge required to answer 
the question [2].  
Table 1 indicates four dimensions of epistemic beliefs, for which 
there is general agreement across the various models of belief3. 
These dimensions are useful to consider in relation to student 
understanding of knowledge domains. For example, in the context 
of search engine IR tasks, “epistemological beliefs are a lens for a 
learner’s views on what is to be learnt” [4]. In such tasks, student 
search activity may be analysed using the dimensions in Table 1 
(e.g. [38]), providing a lens onto students’ understanding of their 
own learning, task demands, and how to meet those demands. 
Table 1: Dimensions of epistemic belief (adapted from [39]) 
Dimension Description 
Certainty of 
knowledge 
The degree to which knowledge is conceived 
as stable or changing, ranging from absolute 
to tentative and evolving knowledge 
Simplicity of 
knowledge 
The degree to which knowledge is conceived 
as compartmentalised or interrelated, ranging 
from knowledge as made up of discrete and 
simple facts to knowledge as complex and 
comprising interrelated concepts 
Source of 
knowledge 
The relationship between knower and known, 
ranging from the belief that knowledge resides 
outside the self and is transmitted, to the 
belief that it is constructed by the self 
Justification 
for knowing 
What makes a sufficient knowledge claim, 
ranging from the belief in observation or 
authority as sources, to the belief in the use of 
rules of inquiry and evaluation of expertise 
 
Epistemic beliefs are thus one example of the type of construct 
which sociocultural LA may probe. However, they are also a 
particularly good example given epistemic beliefs’ relationship to 
our everyday dealings with the world of information, and their 
relationship to pedagogy, assessment, and classroom practices 
[28]. Section 5 will discuss epistemic beliefs in relation to their 
measurement, but we shall first introduce some established 
approaches to pedagogy. 
4. OUR LEARNING ANALYTICS ARE 
OUR PEDAGOGY 
Buckingham Shum [6] has used the shorthand “our LA are our 
pedagogy” – a relationship which we explore in this section. 
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 See e.g. [53] for a review of the multiple theoretical frameworks  
4.1 Pedagogy and LA? 
The relationship between LA and pedagogy is important because 
they are both bound up in epistemology – what knowledge is. This 
section explicitly introduces the relationship between a number of 
established pedagogic approaches and LA. These are not intended 
as comprehensive reviews, but rather as brief overviews of how 
the relationship between pedagogy and LA might be 
conceptualised. The following section expands on some key ideas 
here, before moving on to explicate the core topic of this paper – a 
sociocultural learning analytic – and one proposed instantiation of 
an LA based on this approach.  
4.1.1 Transactional or instructionalist approach 
Transactional approaches hold that learning entails the transfer of 
knowledge from the knower (teacher) to the learner (student). 
They are characterized by a perspective on assessment in which 
success is ‘out there’, in the degree of correspondence between 
the claims that learners make, and the facts that they have been 
taught. 
Analytics Implications: LA based on transactional approaches – 
both in learning, and more broadly – will tend to focus on very 
simple metrics such as test scores and hit counters, as opposed to 
any deeper analysis of project outputs or processes. 
4.1.2 Constructivist approach 
Constructivist models hold that learning occurs in the guided 
experimentation of the learner (student) on the world, typically in 
classrooms in which such experimentation is age-targeted, and 
guided by a teacher. Constructivist models are likely to hold a 
notion of success which highlights construction, with learners 
experimenting with their environment, and being capable of using 
tools which are appropriate for their given age.  
Analytics Implications: LA with a focus on constructivist 
approaches of learning will focus on progress, particularly 
through a set of materials, resources or tools selected and arranged 
by the teacher. 
4.1.3 Subjectivist or affect based approach 
Subjectivist perspectives can be characterised as deemphasizing 
learning qua academia, in pursuit of personal affect. While 
individual affect is a concern for educationalists, it is rarely if ever 
the overarching concern in the consideration of learning. 
However, for example in IR, subjectivist approaches are more 
interested in whether the user is ‘satisfied’ with the information 
they have found, than whether the information is ‘good’. 
Analytics Implications: In tandem with other approaches, LA 
based on ‘subjectivist’ approaches are likely to provide motivation 
assessments for understanding why someone is (or is not) 
undertaking particular actions (see, e.g. [20]). Such analytics may 
focus on explicit moves (feedback forms, affect-based semantic 
markup such as blog tagging) alongside more implicit analysis 
such as sentiment analysis of communication data. 
4.1.4 Apprenticeship approach 
Apprenticeship approaches are sometimes used in LA with an 
interest in whether the learner has become part of a community of 
activity. In this view, success is about ‘being part of’ a given 
group; it is bound up in notions of communities of practice – that 
‘to know x’ is to act towards x in some way that is defined by (or 
reflected in) the behaviours of some community or other. 
Analytics Implications: Analytics based on apprenticeship 
approaches are likely to focus on classifying expert and novice 
users, and the shift from novice to expert. Such analysis may 
explore behavioural markers which mirror those made by 
‘experts’, but may not explore the reasons or meanings implicated 
in such moves. 
4.1.5 Connectivist approach 
Connectivism [55] claims to highlight a perspective on 
epistemology which translates into a LA framework. Within this 
view, learning is about understanding how to connect ideas 
appropriately, and where to find such information. The suggestion 
is that in the case of the connectivist knower “the act of knowing 
is offloaded onto the network itself” [55]. Within this perspective 
then, success is about building connections between ideas.  
Analytics Implications: Connectivist approaches use network 
analysis to explore the ‘connectedness’ of a learner’s knowledge –
in terms of both concepts, and social connections. Analytics 
would look at how networks’ size, quality and changes over time 
can serve as proxies for effective learning.  
4.1.6 Pragmatic, sociocultural approach 
Pragmatic approaches (building on for example, Dewey [16]) hold 
that learning occurs in the development of – and negotiation of – a 
mutually shared perspective between learners. Such approaches 
focus less on truth – where truth reflects facts about the world – 
than how meaning is co-constructed, and used in context. 
Pragmatists suggest that, as human knowers, our conception of 
some given thing is bound up in our understanding of its practical 
application – and that is all. When we attempt to understand truth 
beyond such a conceptualisation of practical activity, we are likely 
to fail. Thus, success is in use – the measure of success is how 
useful the information is for the purposes it is employed; it is 
socioculturally embedded and mediated, and may be in flux as 
activities are defined and redefined. 
Analytics Implications: Pragmatic approaches have traditionally 
focused less on assessing the products of learning (except where 
they are being used for something), and more on the process. 
Analytics tools in sociocultural approaches encourage learners to 
reflect on their own activity, in an attempt to understand how they 
can develop their skills in information processing, in their own 
particular contexts. Analytics within this approach might attend 
particularly to quality of discourse for learning, for creating a 
mutuality of perspectives [18] including in collaborative IR tasks 
[22, 27, 35]. Our previous work is in this tradition, drawing on 
sociocultural discourse analysis [40], argumentation theory [60, 
61] and argumentation in sensemaking deliberation [45]. This 
research foregrounds how students interact with information; 
make sense of it in their context; and co-construct meaning in 
shared contexts. These are on-going processes which highlight the 
question of how LA fits into the context of AfL and pedagogy. 
4.2 Epistemology and LA 
The stance we take with regard to the relationship between 
epistemology, assessment and LA relates to the issue of whether 
we envisage analytics as a form of diagnosis on the one hand or a 
kind of biofeedback on the other – is LA (and assessment) the end 
point of, or a component of, pedagogy. In the former we seek to 
accredit learning through defining behavioural proxies taken as 
evidence of knowledge and competencies. LA may also be used to 
support learners in their own self-regulated learning activities, 
giving them feedback on changes they make and their impact on 
learning outcomes, but without – generally – making strong 
evaluative judgments regarding such changes. The former is thus 
more closely aligned with assessment of learning – often 
instantiated in high stakes summative assessment, while the latter 
is closer to Assessment for Learning – in which assessment is a 
continuous process through which formative feedback may be 
given to further develop the students learning (see e.g. [3, 23]). If 
process-centric competencies are declared to be part of the 
summative assessment criteria, then the two categories converge. 
The relationships highlighted in 4.1.1-4.1.6 serve as general 
pointers to the sorts of relationships we might see between 
pedagogy and LA. There we also highlight views on learning, 
alongside notions of how success may be defined within these 
approaches; that is, when these systems might accredit knowledge 
to the student. Fundamentally, this accreditation implicates 
epistemological stances regarding when knowledge may be 
claimed (or not). These are general claims, but illustrative of how 
such notions relate to those of LA, in particular notions of: 
 Mastering curriculum content: this is the dominant focus 
of analytics approaches at present, seeking behavioural 
markers using e-assessment technologies of varying 
sophistication, in order to generate summaries at varying 
granularities, for both individuals and cohorts. (Particularly 
transactional and some constructivist approaches) 
 Evidencing membership and processes: this approach to 
LA looks for behavioural proxies which indicate a student is 
part of a particular subgroup; positive feedback is given 
towards moving students into ‘successful’ subgroups, but 
little attention is paid to the qualities of those groups except 
instrumentally. (Particularly affect-based, apprenticeship, 
and possibly connectivist approaches) 
 Success is use: this approach looks for students developing 
personal and collective representations of curriculum 
content, and engagement in sensemaking about not only this 
material, but also their own analytics. Social Learning 
Analytics [7, 21] in which students are encouraged and 
supported to do so may work towards this end. (Particularly 
pragmatist approaches). 
These three broad conceptualisations of LA relate to the issue of 
whether or not we are deemed to consume, discover, or create 
(internally or/and externally) knowledge – is it ‘out there’ for us 
to take, do we need to investigate to find it, or is it formed in our 
developing understandings of the relationships between entities 
and the new representations we create in such activities? This is 
not a claim about the learning or pedagogy, but a related claim 
about the status of knowledge, and its assessment, which we 
discuss further in section 6.4 with reference to one particular 
example.  
4.2.1 Pragmatism and sociocultural approaches to 
assessment  
The nuance of claims surrounding epistemology and assessment is 
important. In the introduction we referred to research arguing that 
conventional exams are designed to maximise the reliability of 
results, at the cost of straitjacketing what can be defined as 
learning (poor internal or construct validity) and thus what 
constitutes evidence of learning (poor external validity). 
Moreover, if we are to argue that individual tokens of knowledge 
cannot be identified (and ‘owned’), then we should accept that 
“the content of a specific item of knowledge depends in part on 
how it is related to other knowledge” [10]. Thus, sociocultural 
setting, interaction, and the purposes for which any artefact or 
knowledge – in the broadest sense – is being used, are all of 
fundamental importance in understanding how people make 
meaning, and learn. Contextual sensitivity is thus a key facet of 
pragmatist approaches.  
Pragmatic approaches, broadly, are likely to focus on the dynamic 
nature of information needs, and the discourse and other artefacts 
which mediate our relationship with information in the world. It is 
not a postmodern approach, in the sense that postmodern 
approaches take either a relativist approach (there is no fixed 
truth) or a normative one (the dominant theme is correct at that 
time) to knowledge, but rather one which focuses on use, and 
meaning, over accreditation of facts to things in the world. 
4.2.1.1 Pragmatic Analytics Revisited 
As described in Section 4.1.6, pragmatic approaches have 
traditionally focused less on assessing the products of learning, 
and more on the process. LA in these approaches might encourage 
learners to reflect on their own contextualised activity, in order to 
instil an ethos and capacity to become reflective practitioners. The 
key development with the emergence of digital LA is that 
previously ephemeral processes are now persistent, not just for 
researchers studying those processes, but for the learners and 
educators co-constructing those processes. Moreover, the process 
traces are now amenable to computational analysis which opens 
new possibilities for assessment and feedback, both formative, 
and possibly even summative (e.g. where the assessment regime 
defines those process skills to be an important form of student 
evidence). 
Given the salience of context in this approach, it deserves further 
explication. As with LA generally, context may be taken as very 
mechanistic, for example the claim that a person in 
place/course/role/ability band ‘x’ should see resource ‘y’, or other 
approaches which would include time, topic, or social-group 
resource discovery. No doubt some of these features will prove 
useful, and indeed the use of semantic web technology in social 
learning analytics [21] may be particularly interesting. However, 
in addition to temporal, linguistic, aptitude, and geo-spatial 
markers, we draw attention to the following: 
1. We emphasise the discourse in which, and through which, 
context is constituted [17, 44]. That is, we take the discourse 
to have a multifaceted role in constituting, and helping 
learners make sense of, the context.  
2. Discourse is fundamentally associated with the sensemaking 
which occurs in respect of any particular task being 
undertaken; the use being targeted is fundamental to 
context. Stark examples highlight this importance, for 
example where we ask students to critique versus 
summarise a paper we expect rather different outcomes. 
Assessment regimes which make this explicit may facilitate 
capture of context around ’doing x for purpose y’ LA 
3. These assessment systems (2, above), and the broad range of 
tools, technological and otherwise, which people utilise also 
act as mediating artefacts impacting on how people perceive 
their task, and its solution – mediating the context of use.  
We have, therefore, expounded a view of LA which highlights the 
importance of context. This relates to a salient point for epistemic 
beliefs that: 
A sophisticated epistemology entails context-sensitive 
judgements. Thus they point out that it is not very 
sophisticated to view the idea that the earth is round rather 
than flat as ‘tentative’ whereas theories of dinosaur 
extinction do require a more tentative stance [1].  
Similarly, building spurious connections between ideas as a way 
of indicating a complex view of knowledge (within the simplicity 
dimension) is likely to be less sophisticated than those who 
understand the need for moderation, and so on. Context is thus 
key to understanding epistemic beliefs, the analysis of which 
seems highly suited to the biofeedback approach to formative 
assessment analytics, introduced earlier.  
The next section further expands this claim in the context of 
psychological assessment of epistemic beliefs, firstly in 
‘mainstream’ psychological approaches, and then that of the 
discursive approach – which similarly holds context and discourse 
to be fundamental to understanding thinking. Section 6 then 
returns to LA, drawing out the relationship between analytics, and 
the measurement of epistemic beliefs in our illustrative example 
for sociocultural, pragmatic analytics. 
5. MEASURING EPISTEMIC BELIEFS 
The complexity of epistemic cognition suggests a particular 
perspective on how we are to understand these beliefs. No 
approach ‘mirrors’ reality with a true, immutable, incontrovertible 
perspective on a learner’s epistemic cognition. This concern is a 
dual one. Firstly, it is a methodological concern regarding our 
access to the world, our ability to ’get at’ what is out there. 
Secondly, it is a conceptual and psychological concern, regarding 
the nature of epistemic cognition and whether it itself is stable – 
developmentally, and across domains – or shaped in some way by 
resources or beliefs. These two concerns are reflected in the 
epistemic beliefs literature. Firstly, cognitive developmental 
models [33, 34] suggest that individuals progress through a 
sequence of increasingly sophisticated epistemic beliefs, while 
multidimensional perspectives [28; 52] suggest that epistemic 
beliefs can be separated into dimensions, within which levels of 
sophistication can be identified [24]. However, both of these 
assume a fixed uni-directional developmental trajectory, where 
beliefs are seen as global across (and within) domains. The 
resources view, in contrast, emphasizes the interaction of believer, 
with resources, highlighting that at various points in any task a 
cognizer may invoke differing resources [25]. 
Secondly, methodologically the developmental models have 
tended towards interviews and laboratory tasks, while 
multidimensional models have emphasised paper and pencil self-
report measures [14]. Both of these approaches reflect the fixed 
perspective on beliefs from which theory they stem. Importantly, 
although three major survey instruments have been developed and 
deployed, – including in IR tasks [37, 52] – they are heavily 
criticised for their psychometric properties [14]. Furthermore, 
while some studies have used interview [1, 39], think-aloud 
protocols [1, 19] or systematic observation [51] such methods 
may be limited in their insights, particularly where self-report data 
is to be used and interpreted by researchers. Importantly, they are 
also not appropriate for the study of online, collaborative, or 
geographically and temporally spread activities – in particular, 
online IR, or information processing more broadly. These 
approaches reflect the epistemology of current assessment 
regimes, as indicated in Section 2, and seem to implicate the view 
of ‘fixed’ psychological constructs – whether intelligence, or 
epistemic beliefs, as further discussed throughout Section 3.  
In contrast, while those adopting a resources view of epistemic 
beliefs may also utilize such methods – in particular those 
involving think aloud and interview data – they also accord well 
with Österholm’s discursive stance, which suggests that we 
should not see beliefs and communication as “two separate 
‘objects’ that can affect each other, but as more integrated aspects 
of cognition and/or behaviour” [42]. The resources view describes 
“the activity, the discourse, as the site where epistemological 
beliefs come to existence, through explicit or implicit references 
to prior experiences (epistemological resources)” [43]. 
Österholm’s argument is that the resources perspective can be 
combined with Hammer and Elby’s [25] resources model. In this 
model epistemic beliefs are not viewed as fixed, or developing 
cognitive models ranging over one or more domains, but are 
rather seen as dependent upon the resources available to the 
cognizer at any time. This view of epistemic beliefs as “theory-in-
action” – in which context, domain, culture, and task conditions 
interact – accords well with the idea that context is fundamental to 
understanding meaning. 
5.1 Learning Analytics and Trace Data 
While Österholm is primarily interested in spoken interactions, 
LA may extend this interest into the exploration of users’ 
interactions with artefacts. A tool for such analysis may come 
through the use of trace data, which is more or less implicitly 
created by the student. For example, Stadtler and Bromme [56] 
analysed the ways participants found, extracted, and moved 
information – which could be used to explore information about 
their beliefs (e.g. visiting few websites indicates trust in those 
sites visited [24]). Importantly in this study, users were either 
given evaluation prompts regarding multiple documents in the 
medical domain, or not, and those who received such prompts 
subsequently recalled more facts and were better able to evaluate 
sources. If systems of prompts promote laziness, we should be 
concerned. Where, however, they improve outcomes, analytics 
should explore the best ways to implement them effectively and 
sustainably to support high quality pedagogy and AfL. 
Furthermore, Greene et al. [24] point out that many behaviours 
which would ordinarily be difficult to observe can be explicitly 
elicited in the context of Computer Based Learning Environments 
(CBLEs), for example: 
…participants who report belief in objective truth and omniscient 
authority may self-regulate quite differently than participants with 
a desire to evaluate multiple forms of justification. Likewise, 
participants who believe in the inherent subjectivity of all 
knowledge may, on average, select more representations than 
those who look for an objective truth. [24] 
The claim is thus that epistemic beliefs will be brought to bear on 
knowledge tasks in ways that can be meaningfully captured, in 
particular using technology systems (e.g. the way people represent 
knowledge in mind maps). Trace data thus offers direct access to 
real-time behaviours in unobtrusive ways, and is thus high in 
external validity, although it is of course within the context of the 
system which is set up to capture such information. Furthermore, 
while trace data is unobtrusive, it may give an incomplete picture. 
In particular, people may have reasons for some behaviours which 
cannot be probed using such data; these reasons may range from 
epistemic (as discussed above, for example with regard to the ‘flat 
earth’ issue), to practical (ICT failures), to pragmatic (the 
demands of the task place a short time restriction on the activity), 
and so on. Thus, it is important to remember that while analytics 
regarding epistemic beliefs may be – at best – a dirty lens onto 
those beliefs, when analytics are considered in action as a tool for 
sensemaking, they may provide an insightful tool for learners to 
dissect their own metacognitive and self-regulatory behaviours. 
6. TRACE FOR EPISTEMIC BELIEFS  
Trace data thus provides one means by which epistemic beliefs 
could be examined. However, trace could refer to many things, 
and as discussed in sections 4.1.1-4.1.5 the data collected may not 
represent an appropriate teaching epistemology, nor capture 
adequately student epistemologies (see section 2). The next 
section will discuss some LA which may address this issue. 
6.1 LA – Tools for Trace? 
Building on sections 4.1.1-4.1.5, we can identify a number of 
analytic tools and their relationships to particular forms of data. 
Some forms of analytics rely on a belief that particular methods 
(self-report in particular) are: a) true reflections of reality, b) 
whole reflections of reality (i.e. they cover all the relevant ground) 
and c) probe ‘real’ constructs. However, while self-report 
measures may be useful particularly as discussion prompts with 
students, they are not necessarily the most useful approach for 
many purposes. In both assessment and psychological testing, 
they suffer from issues of validity (Sections 2 and 6.2). Thus, 
other LA tools may prove more useful.  
Much LA thus delves into network analysis, in relation to social-
networks, or in relation to concept networks based upon semantic 
relations identified more or less explicitly by the student. While 
these approaches offer useful insights into the sensemaking 
process, they too can fall into the trap of ‘accrediting’ group 
memberships, over group activities (section 4.1.4) or map 
networks, as opposed to map uses (section 4.1.5).  
An interesting notion then, is attempting to delve further into the 
sensemaking significance behind particular semantic moves in a 
given environment. Thus, Greene et al. [24] (see 5.1) described 
one method of trace analysis for epistemic beliefs built on 
information moves. Other examples of such trace capture could 
also be structured such as to gather student data in particular ways 
– some of which may be quite naturalistic (capturing search 
queries, or Facebook posts to explore ‘problems’ encountered, or 
interactions made [36]), and others of which might push students 
into information structuring activity in which they would not 
otherwise engage, such as argument mapping. 
6.2 Trace and Traceability 
However, in encouraging such structuring by learners, and 
claiming capture information about what they are doing, some 
may argue that we are simply reifying the constructs we have set 
out to explore. That is, if we are interested in epistemic beliefs, 
and set up a system to push students to make epistemic beliefs 
explicit, it does not matter whether those students have underlying 
epistemic beliefs because the system forces them into making 
some (it makes them reify). While for psychologists who wish to 
uncover underlying beliefs this is problematic, we do not see this 
as a concern for our project, because in our discursive, 
sociocultural, pragmatic approach the interest is in beliefs as 
“theory-in-action”. In this view, the claim is not that the 
measurement of beliefs is not possible, but rather that when we 
take measurements, the discursive context is fundamental to the 
practices being observed, and the ways that the beliefs are 
instantiated in action. Thus, LA provides a means to tackle the 
static, decontextualized view of epistemic beliefs instantiated by 
questionnaire methods, offering a more authentic perspective on 
epistemic action than experimental contexts. 
6.3 Discourse-centric Trace – A Path to 
Epistemic Cognition 
A number of tools can be conceptualised to probe trace gathered 
around higher order thinking exercises, and some already exist. 
One example – which will be used for illustrative purposes here – 
is being developed at the Open University, based around the 
Cohere argument mapping tool [5] and previous work on 
sociocultural discourse-centric LA [36]. Cohere is a web 
application for mapping ideas, concepts and arguments, which can 
be annotated directly onto source websites. Users enter ideas – 
nodes with meaningful classifications – and are then invited to 
“make the connection” with meaningfully labelled edges, to create 
a conceptual graph. Both ideas and connections may also be 
tagged, to add a further level of semantic data. Cohere is designed 
as a tool to enable users to build their own structures, but also to 
share these, and integrate the nodes and connections of other 
users, thus building up communities of enquiry around particular 
disciplinary topics.  
Cohere facilitates exploring the ways that users create nodes, and 
the epistemic implications of such creation. At a basic level, this 
could simply be an analysis of the number of idea and connection 
types used. A more advanced analysis might compare individuals’ 
Cohere use on the same task, and provide analytics based on such 
comparison; these notions are discussed further below. However, 
neither of these explores the semantic qualities of ideas and 
connections. Using the broad epistemic ‘dimensions’ described 
above (Table 1) some correspondences between those descriptors, 
and possible trace can be identified as in Table 24 which also 
gives ‘suggested guidance’, intended to be indicative of the sorts 
of challenges which might be posed to students to extend their 
epistemic cognition and probe their learning processes. 
However, within the approach described above it should be 
understood that while the trace data given here is theoretically tied 
to the constructs, both the constructs and the trace should be seen 
in their situated context – as components of a sociocultural 
environment, interacting with the relevant agents (students, 
teachers, designers, etc.), and the wider cultures and subcultures. 
Thus, the possible trace markers and guidance are conceptually 
related to the work discussed above but these should be dynamic 
tools, and empirical work will be needed to explore the 
relationship between feedback given, representations allowed, 
student responses to feedback and the impact of this on learning. 
6.4 Many Lenses on Epistemic Beliefs 
Table 2 thus proposes one set of traces from which meaningful 
data could be captured. This is not, however, to dismiss other 
approaches discussed in Section 4.1. The epistemological 
approach discussed throughout this work is instead intended to 
indicate that what drives our Learning Analytics – and assessment 
– is not what they are, but rather, what we do with them. Our 
suggestion is that many of these approaches to LA – these dirty 
lenses on the world – provide insights into different levels of 
learning, and tools for meaning-making. For example, with this 
richer than normal data model in place, it is very simple, 
computationally, to feed back the number of ideas, and connection 
types used, but this may provoke meaningful dialogue regarding 
what these other types might be used for, or why they have not 
thus far been used. Similarly, constructive discourse might occur 
around the reasons why one student’s map is more connected (but 
perhaps not appropriately so) than another’s.  
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  Following previous work [36] the basic analytic statistic is constructed 
as a percentage representation of the target type, over the total types 
created by the user. For example, the number of ‘opinion’ nodes created, 
as a percentage of the total number of nodes created by that user.  
Table 2: Trace & Guidance for Epistemic Beliefs 
 Trace Guidance/Challenge  
C
er
ta
in
ty
 Presence of competing 
claims (e.g. supports/ 
challenges). 
Presence of stability 
markers – e.g. current 
references, geographic 
repetition. 
Are there two sides to this 
idea? Could you explore 
XY contrasting example? 
Is this idea consistent across 
time/place? Have you 
looked at XY map? 
S
im
p
li
ci
ty
 Number of connections 
between nodes. 
Are any of these ideas 
connected? Have you 
considered how WX and 
YZ might be connected? 
S
o
u
rc
e Presence of ‘I think’ or 
restatement of fact, few 
additional nodes made 
other than those created as 
quotations. 
What do you think of these 
ideas? or How does the 
evidence relate to your 
view? 
J
u
st
if
ic
a
ti
o
n
 Judgments of relevance, 
and supporting or 
explanatory notes (‘this 
evidences/ explains x’). 
Ties to method ‘ideas’.  
What evidence do we have 
for this idea? Is it ‘good’ 
evidence? Why/why not? 
 
There is a strong relationship between analytics, assessment, 
pedagogy, and epistemology (Figure 1), which sociocultural 
analytics bridges well. Our approach should be seen as one of 
‘many lenses’ for many contexts, used in combination with the 
more conventional forms of LA currently dominating. In the last 
section before concluding, we outline how the approaches 
discussed in Section 4.1 relate to epistemic beliefs, and some 
strengths and limitations of these approaches. 
6.4.1 Lenses Onto the World 
LA based on Transactional approaches. Approaches which 
emphasise fixed, ‘correct’ knowledge, over how those facts are 
used to display understanding, are likely to encourage lower 
epistemic cognition, and implicate more ‘realist’ epistemologies 
which see knowledge as a reflection of ‘things’ in the world.  
LA based on Constructivist approaches. Similarly, there may 
be an overemphasis on a limited range of knowledge in 
constructivist approaches which emphasise development qua 
progression, but without considering the sociocultural context in 
which that progression occurs, nor the wide range of uses for 
which it may be deployed. This may be particularly true in 
constrained systems which guide students through pre-set tasks 
and levels of attainment to meet, pre-specified software, and so 
on, as compared to those exploring knowledge co-constructed in 
iterative dialogic discourse [49, 50]. Understanding the ways that 
students build knowledge claims – understanding connections, 
justifications, change over time, and nuance – is fundamental to 
understanding their epistemic beliefs. Knowing that a student is at 
stage x of y in development may be less significant.  
LA based on Apprenticeship approaches. In a similar vein, 
apprenticeship approaches can offer useful insight into group 
membership and the development of a student’s thinking. 
However, the approach described in this paper suggests the best 
way in which to think about such approaches is with respect to the 
functional role that such community membership plays in a 
student’s epistemic action, and their normative standards.  
LA based on Subjectivist approaches. LA based on ‘affect’ 
could be useful to analysis of epistemic beliefs, with their analysis 
of ‘satisfaction’ with information, e.g. enquiry based learning 
[20]; self-efficacy in IR [58]; satisfaction with search results [30]. 
As such, affective analytics might be used to explore whether 
learners are prematurely satisfied with findings that a peer or 
educator deems to be inadequate, or if they have an appropriate 
sense of disquiet or frustration with a flawed argument or 
methodology. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper started with the premise that assessment, pedagogy and 
epistemology are fundamentally entwined. Furthermore, we 
suggested that a focus on high stakes assessment – which learning 
analytics may well be used to perpetuate – is detrimental to the 
wider enterprise of education, prioritising the reliability of tightly 
defined assessments over continuing, formative assessment for 
learning, and authentically situated learning which is harder to fit 
into formal examination contexts. This is problematic in so far as 
it limits the ways we can challenge students in assessments, and 
fails to reflect their encounters with knowledge claims in the 
world beyond the classroom walls.  
We have highlighted that transactional approaches may emphasise 
use of facts; constructivist the broad (and contextual) application 
of skills; subjectivist the self-efficacy and motivators of students; 
apprenticeship the dynamic practical based learning which may 
occur through high level membership of communities of practice; 
connectivism the ability of students to build up, link and curate 
their knowledge ‘networks’. A sociocultural, pragmatic, approach 
may offer an additional toolset, alongside a theoretical frame 
through which to use other LA lenses. All are partial (in bias, and 
hence in their coverage of all that might be measured), but may be 
used in complementary ways.  
Analytics from user traces provide a means to track and record 
previously ephemeral process data, which could benefit 
assessment for learning in significant new ways. Pragmatist 
approaches, which emphasise use and meaning-making over the 
accrediting of true statements may have an important role here. 
The grasp of curriculum facts and methods remains critical but the 
emphasis shifts to their effective, contextualised use, in argument 
structures, in discussion, in problem-solving. A focus on the 
sociocultural learning system draws attention to how analytics 
take into account the centrality of discourse for sensemaking, and 
in constituting “context”. 
We have gone beyond “our learning analytics are our pedagogy” 
[6], arguing that they embody epistemological assumptions, and 
they perpetuate assessment regimes. Moreover, as with any tool, it 
is not only the design of the tool, but the way in which it is 
wielded in context, that defines its value.  
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